

PARTIAL REVISION OF SE-36

DRAFT

CLANDESTINE DELIVERY

27. Atomic Weapons: The USSR is considered capable of producing atomic weapons which could be smuggled into the U.S. either as complete assemblies or as component parts or sub-assemblies. The assembled devices could range from small-yield weapons (5 KT or less) weighing a few hundred pounds to larger-yield weapons (possibly up to 500 KT) weighing several thousand pounds. Their size could range from that of a package small enough to fit into the luggage compartment of an automobile to that of a packing case large enough to contain an automobile.

27a. All of these weapons could be designed to break down into a number of relatively simple and readily transportable components. Those designed to give a relatively low kilotonnage yield would not require much technical skill to assemble. More skill, however, would be required to assemble weapons designed to give high yields, and, once assembled, they would be more difficult to transport.

27b. It is conceivable that only the fissionable material, in small pieces, need be smuggled into the U.S., while the other components are being fabricated or procured in this country. This scheme, however, would require time, careful advance planning and coordination, considerable

engineering skill, and familiarity with the U.S. industrial system.

It would probably result in a low yield for a given amount of fissionable material. It would incur the maximum security risk.

28. A variety of forms of clandestine delivery suggest themselves. Assembled weapons could be dropped by apparently friendly type aircraft, could be detonated in the hold of an innocent looking merchant ship, or could be sown as underwater mines. Either components or assembled weapons could be brought in under diplomatic immunity, landed from submarines, smuggled across land frontiers, introduced through normal import channels or as bonded merchandise awaiting trans/shipment. The selection of the method of introduction and of transport and assembly within the U.S. would depend on the Soviet objective and the risk of detection which the USSR was willing to accept.

28a. Considering the known limitations of the means of physical detection, it is probable that the USSR could deliver a considerable number of atomic weapons in the U.S. by clandestine means. As the number is increased, however, the risk of compromise increases disproportionately. This increased risk would be less a function of U.S. technical capabilities for physical detection than of the increased number of Soviet agents involved in the clandestine operation. It is felt that the USSR would not rely upon the loyalty and discretion of even selected and trained agents in such large numbers as must be involved in a large-scale operation of this character, especially in view of the consequences of a breach of security in forfeiting the

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15-74551

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000800060010-5

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element of surprise in any intended overt attack and in provoking U.S. counteraction. We conclude, therefore, that, although clandestine attack with atomic weapons might occur on a relatively small scale against specially selected targets as a supplement to overt delivery by air, such an attack, on a scale comparable to that which might be delivered by air, would probably be precluded by security considerations.

28b. We have no evidence to indicate whether or not the USSR has actually made any plans or preparations for the clandestine delivery of atomic weapons.

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